Infection control and systems
The subject of hospital infection control and prevention has recently become the subject of much media attention in the UK (The Guardian, 2007; BBC Panorama, 2008) . A number of high profile hospital outbreaks within the UK involving bacterium such as
Clostridium difficile (C. diff.) and MRSA (Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus) have raised infection control into a central priority for the UK NHS and other health care systems worldwide (Allegranzi et al., 2007) . Much of the debate so far has concentrated on improving hygiene within hospitals (e.g., hand washing, deep cleaning), very little research has been conducted on the wider behavioural, social and organisational factors that may also determine infection control outbreaks (Griffiths, Renz and Rafferty, 2008) . Hospitals are complex sociotechnical systems, spanning a range of technologies (e.g., medical devices, electronic records), actors (e.g., clinicians, health care professionals) and aspects of physical design (e.g., wards and operating theatres) (van Maanen and Barley, 1985) . Within systems ergonomics Rasmussen (1997) has provided a modelling framework for understanding the dynamic interaction between these types of components within a large-scale sociotechnical system. The framework consists of two main components: a structural hierarchy describing the various actors; and, contextual factors influencing the activities of the actors (figure 1).
Figure 1 about here Vicente and Christoffersen (2006) have used the modelling framework to identify the lessons learnt from the May 2000 outbreak of E. coli which occurred in Walkerton, Canada. Their analysis identified a set of contributing factors that led up to the Walkerton outbreak. These included decisions made at governmental levels (e.g., privatisation initiatives), the action of actors within the system (e.g., failures to take water samples), as well as equipment failures (e.g., shallow water wells).
The aim of the present paper is to examine in detail an example of a series of infection outbreaks as they occurred within a complex sociotechnical system from the • To explore the potential of using systems ergonomics in order to analyse and explain the causes of the outbreaks;
• To consider the relationships that exist within and between system levels and use these to suggest new ways of examining causal dependencies and linkages;
• To consider the implications of a systems analysis in terms of recommendations for future research and practice within infection control.
In section 2 the methodology and steps used to analyse the outbreaks and perform the systems analysis are described. Section 3 describes the background to the outbreak alongside a set of contributory factors that have been highlighted in the report produced by the UK Healthcare Commission in 2007. Section 4 of the paper describe the outcomes of the systems ergonomic analysis. The final section (section 4) describes strategies that could be used in order to help prevent further outbreaks occurring, and discusses the findings within the context of previous and future research within infection control.
Methodology
Very few explicit guidelines exist for carrying out systems analyses within human factors and ergonomics. Rather than fixed or definitive methods of analysis, researchers have in the past adopted a number of methods and techniques, often in parallel (e.g., Singleton et al., 1967; Optner,1973; Beishon and Peters, 1976 Commission , 2006, 2008) . The analysis took the form of summarising the main contributory factors leading up to the outbreak at Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells. In particular, examples of human and organisational factors covering a range of system-related dimensions were extracted from the report (e.g., relationships between external organisations, management, group and individual behaviour, workplace design and equipment).
(2) Construction of a timeline of events -based upon the 2007 report the main events leading up to the outbreaks were summarised (table 1) .
System analysis (3) System modelling -this involved mapping the contributory factors onto a systems framework, in this case the risk management framework described by Rasmussen (1997) . The mapping task also involved modifying the risk management in order to fit the specific details of the outbreak and coverage of the main system components (see figures 2 a, b and c).
(4) The final stage of the analysis involved examining the resulting system model in order to propose possible causal linkages and relationships between specific system levels (e.g., hospital management and clinical management levels), as well as links and relationships which may have applied to the system as a whole.
System description of the Clostridium difficile outbreak in the Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells NHS Trust
The description and analysis of the outbreak is primarily based upon the report produced by the Healthcare Commission (HC) (2007) . In addition, other sources of documentary information concerning the outbreak were consulted, these included previous reports of outbreaks (e.g., Healthcare Commission, 2006) , as well as other literature within the area of health care-related infection control (e.g., National Audit Office, 2000; Duerden, 2008; Healthcare Commission, 2008) . (HC, 2007) report identified a number of factors that contributed to the outbreaks that occurred with the trust. The following sections present a selection of the main findings from the report.
The role of external organisations
The external body responsible for the National Health Service as a whole is the UK government. Aside from developing overall NHS strategy and policy, the government is also responsible for allocating budgets and setting financial and service level targets (e.g., maximum waiting times for operations, hospital stays). Within the report both the setting of targets and financial pressures on NHS trusts are mentioned as background, contributory factors that had an impact on the day-to-day operation of the Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells trust. In particular, the report mentions the need for trust board members and managers to meet throughout targets for the use of beds. Health Authority (SHA), the report mentions that until recently the SHA were more focused on outbreaks of other healthcare associated infections (e.g., MRSA), partly because these were at the time of the outbreaks one of the national priority to which performance targets were attached.
Management of the trust
The report describes a catalogue of problems and failures associated with the management of the trust at the time of the outbreaks. In addition, other factors contributed to the problems faced by managers and trust board members, these included high turnover of senior managers over the period of the outbreaks and a management style that was described in the report as "reactive, with frequent changes of direction" (HC, 2007, p. 8) .
In terms of clinical risks and incidents, the report describes how management strategy in general "had been fragmentary and poorly understood" (HC, 2007, p. 77 HC, 2007, p. 77) . Similar problems applied to systems in place that were designed to learn about and respond to clinical incidents. The reports from an internal group set up within the trust in order to analyse complaints, claims and incidents highlight, amongst others, the following issues: the unsatisfactory nature of some "escalation" areas (areas temporarily set up to deal with infected patients), areas which were opened to take admissions; the effect the accident and emergency (A&E) target had on the quality of care; poor quality handover and transfer to wards from A&E; concerns about staffing levels, and bank staff managing wards on some shifts.
The style of leadership within the trust and the overall management culture were criticised in the report. Many staff described the leadership of the chief executive as Likewise most staff were afraid to speak out and raise concerns about what was happening within the trust.
Amongst staff, as well as some of those in senior positions within the trust, the overwhelming priority of senior managers was seen to be finance and the need to meet national targets (e.g., A&E targets). Financial restrictions placed a heavy burden upon levels of bed occupancy, staffing levels and the availability of equipment (HC, 2007, p. 93) . The need to satisfy targets was seen as the primary reason why patients were moved around so often, thereby increasing the risk of infections spreading. In addition, poor handover between wards worsened the situation.
Finally, the trust's management of staffing is criticised heavily within the report in several places. The number of nurses working on wards had fallen since the period (HC, 2007, p. 4) . A number of elements are mentioned, including: infrequent reviews of patients by doctors; lack of systematic monitoring as to whether or not a patient was recovering from C. diff; and, failure to change antibiotic treatment when a patient failed to respond to the initial treatment (HC, 2007, p. 4) . Delays in starting treatment occurred on the wards, mostly because there was a delay in sending samples for analysis (HC, 2007, p. 33) . The report found that there was little evidence that once C. diff. had been diagnosed that patients were monitored for severe signs of the infection (HC, 2007, p. 34) . In other cases, it was clear that diagnoses were either not considered or had been missed. In 34% of the cases reviewed, medical records did not indicate that a regular review of C. diff had taken place (HC, 2007, p. 38) . The management of fluids and nutrition on the wards was also inconsistent. In 36% of the case reviewed there was evidence of poor fluid management and in 34% nutritional needs had not been assessed or managed (HC, 2007, p. 38) .
The infection control team
The role played by the infection control team within the trust was a complex one and one made difficult by problems relating to accountability, the amount of resources available to them and their ability to function as a team. The arrangements for accountability were not clear (HC, 2007, p. 54) . Infection control nurses were accountable to the director of nursing, the pathology manager held the budget for these nurses, but did not consider that he had any management responsibly for infection control. Similarly, the clinical director of pathology was not aware of any were not always compensated through the use of locum cover. The degree to which the infection control team worked well together and functioned as a team is criticised in the report (HC, 2007, pp. 53-54) . The microbiologists in the team were seen as helpful by staff, but not natural leaders or champions for infection control. They did not regularly visit wards and were hard to contact. In addition, the advice they gave was often conflicting and inconsistent. The infection control nurses by contrast, visited ward regularly and tended to act as a link between ward staff and microbiologists. However, the report also notes that working relationships between nurses and microbiologists were not always close or supportive. Meetings of the infection control committee were infrequent and clinical staff such as senior nurses and consultants were often not present at the meetings (HC, 2007, p. 54).
Equipment and hygiene
Hygiene practices within the trust and the state of hospital buildings contributed a great deal to the outbreaks. Wards, bathrooms and commodes were not clean and patients had in some cases to share equipment (e.g., Zimmer frames) which were not cleaned before use (HC, 2007, p. 4) . The infection control team were keen to isolate patients once they had been identified as C. diff. cases, however the scarcity of side rooms made this difficult. As a result many patients before and after the outbreaks were kept on open wards. The design of buildings and their age meant that many wards did not have sufficient space for storage or the provision of hand basins in utility rooms.
The buildings in the trust were generally old or in a poor state of repair and when they were first opened did not have adequate cleaning and laundry services (HC, 2007, p. 6) . 
Systems analysis of the outbreaks
In common with most examples of accidents, disasters or large-scale adverse events, the outbreaks can be interpreted as arising through the combination of a number of interrelated systemic factors and influences (Turner, 1978; Reason, 1995) . Figure 2 (a) attempts to use some of the elements of Rasmussen's (1997) risk management framework in order to further analyse the outbreaks. In order to illustrate the framework as it applies to the outbreaks, a sample of the contributory factors are used to link together some of the system components.
Figure 2 (a) here
The upper or macro-levels of the system in figure 2 (a) (government, regulatory, trust governance), can be regarded as representing institutional and organisational influences on the system as a whole. Similarly, lower or micro-levels (e.g., hospital and clinical management, equipment and buildings), represent influences arising through the day-today work of staff and the environment in which they worked. One way in which the outbreaks can be explained is to analyse in further detail the relationships and contributory factors that exist across macro-and micro-levels system levels (Genaidy et al., 2008) . Within the field of organisational behaviour, Hackman (2003) has suggested that researchers adopt the strategy of crossing levels, using what he terms "bracketing" -analysing constructs or influencing factors that exist in two or more system levels.
Within ergonomics, Karsh (2006) has advocated something similar in his use of the term "mesoergonomics" which he defines as "an open system approach to the development of macroergonomic theory and research whereby the relationship between variables in at least two different levels or echelons are studied" (p. 3). Finally, House et al., (1995) suggest that so-called "meso-level" analyses should also address the issue of "isomorphic" constructs within the system. These types of constructs involve analysing the whole system in order to assess: "the degree to which the constituent components of a phenomenon and the relationships among the components are similar across levels of analysis" (House et al., 1995, p. 87) . This pressure in itself may have led them to make poor decisions, and in some cases to prioritise bed occupancy rates at the expense of the risk of an infection outbreak.
Previous research on the influence of targets on management decision-making in health care tends to be equivocal. Bean and Hood (2006) for example, show that the impact of satisfying a specific target (e.g., hospital waiting times) has not been analysed in terms of how this influences other related services (e.g., quality of care). Within the trust it is likely that targets exerted considerable pressure on the system as a whole and this pressure filtered down various levels of the system. It is possible that the drive to comply with these targets increased the likelihood of an adverse event or set of events taking place at some stage within the trust (West, 2000) .
A separate report by the Healthcare Commission (2008) on the impact of mergers on employees has shown that decreased employee motivation and higher staff turnover are frequent outcomes (Cartwright and Cooper, 1993) , alongside poorer organisational performance and productivity (Kiessling, Harvey and Heames, 2008) . Zohar, 2000) . Within health care specifically, West et al. (2002) carried out a largescale survey of the relationship between HRM practices and general in-hospital mortality. The survey showed some aspect of high involvement HRM were associated with lower mortality rates after adjustment for patient and hospital characteristics.
In terms of the overlap between hospital and clinical Management system levels it is
With regard to the interaction between clinical management and equipment and buildings system levels, the report identifies understaffing and general lack of resources, both human and in terms of equipment, as playing a major part in the outbreaks. Staffing ratios, levels of staff morale and inadequate facilities almost certainly contributed to the problem of containing the spread of infection on the wards.
In general, the research literature provides some evidence that lower levels of staffing increase the likelihood of infections occurring. Hugonnet et al. (2004) examined the numbers of nursing staff and staff downsizing relative to infection levels. The researchers found an inverse relationship between staff downsizing and the rate of hospital-based infection. Little research has been conducted on the impact of job satisfaction/morale on hospital infection levels, however, work in other domains (e.g., manufacturing and service industries) suggests that lower levels of satisfaction are clearly linked to lower levels of job performance, as well as being influenced by other environmental factors (Parker and Wall, 1998) .
Whole system relationships
The nature and patterns of decision-making and the capacity for organisational learning within the trust might be singled out as potential "isomorphic" constructs that influenced the outbreaks and the way in which they were subsequently managedfigure 2 (c).
Figure 2 (c) here
Aside from the way in which senior managers behaved at the trust, the questions still remains as to why they ignored, or at least failed to realise the seriousness of the outbreaks and their consequences. Many of the managers interviewed in the original Healthcare Commission report reported that they were aware of how serious the situation had become within the trust, but were powerless to do anything about it. One possible explanation is what Vaughan (1996) in her study of the Challenger shuttle disaster termed the "normalization of deviance"; namely, that managers over time began to accept and take for granted the level of infection risk within the trust. Only after the level of risk built up to a point where it was effectively out of control, did they begin to realise the gravity of the situation.
It might be conjectured that the behaviour of clinicians and other health care professionals across other system levels shares similarities with those of senior managers and trust board managers. Many individuals at ward level were aware of the levels of poor hygiene and inadequate patient monitoring practices, but saw no way to improve the situation. Weick and Sutcliffe (2003) analysed data from the Bristol Royal Infirmary Report (Department of Health, 2001 ) and concluded that hospital staff became locked into particular lines of action or behaviour where they "search for confirmation that they are doing what they should be doing" (p. 73). These so-called 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 F o r P e e r R e v i e w O n l y turn, act as a barrier to change (Tucker and Edmondson, 2003) .
Discussion and future research
The analysis presented in the paper has shown that there are advantages in analysing hospital-based infection outbreaks from a system's perspective. Many of the issues that have been discussed have not been researched within the patient safety literature in much depth, particularly organisational phenomena (Waterson, 2008) . The use of a systems ergonomics analysis facilitates a consideration of a wide range of issues which go beyond the current focus on individual levels of analysis (e.g., behavioural
interventions in the form of hand washing campaigns). There is a need for much further investigation of the social, organisational and managerial aspects of infection outbreaks (Cole, 2008; Griffiths, Renz and Rafferty, 2008) . Future research should, for example, establish the extent that management culture and behaviour have upon infection
outbreaks. This work needs to carried out in tandem with evaluations of the impact of other initiatives that target other system levels (e.g., health care professionals and infection control teams). Without such studies there is a danger that researchers and practitioners gain at best a partial view, with the added result that the design of appropriate interventions will result in partial success, or at worse fail to achieve their objectives.
The process of identifying cross-level and whole-system provides a conceptual frame of reference that could serve as the basis for more focused empirical studies. In particular, future work should aim to follow the trend of recent work in organisational behaviour of using multi-level modelling techniques to unpick cross system (meso-) level relationships. This trend shows some promise and has already been used within health care ergonomics to understand the causes of medical errors (Karsh and Brown, in press) and factors determining the acceptance of electronic medical record systems (Greenhalgh et al., 2008) . In addition, the analysis presented within the paper could be compared and contrasted with alternative models within systems ergonomics (e.g., resilience engineering). This could be achieved, for example, by building simulated computer models of infection control practices and comparing the results from models with hospital-derived data (Brailsford and Schmidt, 2003; Leveson et al., 2006 O n l y O n l y 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47 
